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Abstract: 
Using an over-lapping generations (OLG) model, we show how small open economies can 
enhance their growth through educational subsidies financed via public debt and reduce their 
fertility rate. We show that subsidizing education through public debt leads to a Pareto 
improvement of all generations. Even if a country is a net borrower in the international capital 
market, we show that this subsidy-policy can help, under certain conditions, to improve its net 
borrowing position. Especially, our analysis can be applied to less-developed countries.  
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1 Introduction 
 
It is well-known in the economic literature that human capital accumulation creates positive 
externalities for future generations. This externality is due to the fact that parents who invest 
in the human capital of their children do not internalize the increase of the overall efficiency 
of the human capital accumulation process. Therefore, many economists (c.f. Peters (1995), 
Becker and Murphy (1988), and more recently Rangel (2003), Boldrin and Montes (2005), 
Kaganovich and Meier (2012)) interpret a pay-as-you-go pension system as a mechanism 
through which the intergenerational externality can be internalized. The basic idea in these 
models is simple; if a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension system exists then the pensions depend 
on the labor income of the working generation. The labor income depends on the human 
capital stock of the young generation and therefore on the investments of their parents in 
education. Consequently, the parents invest more in education, because they benefit from it 
through higher pensions.    
However, the majority of papers, which focus on the question of how to internalize the 
externality created by human capital building assume a constant population or a constant 
fertility rate.  
In contrast to these models, we endogenize the fertility behavior and instead of 
analyzing a pay-as-you-go system, we propose an education subsidy which is financed by a 
public debt to internalize the intertemporal externality.  
Even though a public debt is very similar to a pay-as-you-go pension system, there are 
some differences which make an investigation worthwhile. The difference between a pension 
system and a public debt is that the introduction of pension system redistributes immediately 
income from the working population to the older non-working generation. Unfortunately, a 
PAYG system reduces the private savings. If the government sells government bonds on the 
international capital market or borrow alternatively from an institution like the World Bank or 
donor country in the case of a less-developed country (LDC), the country will experience an 
inflow of income from abroad. Additionally, in the case of LDCs, the introduction of a PAYG 
pension system seems to be unrealistic because of the existing public budget constraints in 
these countries. Moreover, even though the argument that parents benefit from educational 
investments in the presence of a PAYG pension system is absolutely correct from an 
economic point of view, it is not clear if this coherence is recognized by parents in reality. In 
contrast, a subsidy is obvious for everyone and maybe that is the reason, why Boldrin and 
Montes (2004, p.22) call the proposal ‘in our view more compelling’, although that they did 
not work out this idea in their paper in detail. Furthermore, their model differs from the 
approach here also in some respects.  
The literature on endogenous fertility and human capital in growth model goes back to 
Becker et al. (1990) and Becker and Barro (1988). Using an intertemporal utility function, 
they assume that that a higher fertility rate of the present generation raises the discount factor 
on per capita future consumption. Consequently, a higher fertility rate discourages 
investments in human and physical capital. On the other hand, higher stocks of physical and 
human capital (education) reduce the number of children because of the high cost of raising 
and caring for children. 
One strand of the literature is based on the work of Kolmar (1997), who integrated 
only endogenous fertility behavior in a standard OLG framework. His idea was further 
extended by Fenge and Meier (2005, 2009) and Groezen et al. (2003). However, these 
scholars did not concentrate on public debts but on PAYG pension systems. They show that 
for a small country under certain conditions, it is possible to increase the fertility rate and the 
welfare simultaneously. They assumed that the pensions depend on the number of children 
and that the growth in population attracts higher capital inflows so that all individuals are 
better off. These results hold only for small open economies. On the contrary, Stauvermann et 
al. (2013) argues that, except for increase in fertility rates, these results do not hold in an 
OLG-model with endogenous growth because reduced savings tend to reduce the per-capita 
growth rates and hence the welfare of future generations. Furthermore, the authors show that 
an increase in fertility is accompanied by high costs for future generations, which further 
decrease the rate of capital accumulation, per capita growth and per capita capital, and hence 
the labor income. 
Another strand of literature goes back to Bental (1989), Raut (1992), Cigno (1993), 
Stauvermann (1996), Zhang and Nishimura (1993), Zhang and Zhang (1995) and Zhang 
(1995). These authors interpret children as insurance for the old age. In their models, the 
introduction of a PAYG pension scheme decreases the importance of children and therefore 
the number of them declines. As a consequence, the per capita income growth rises and the 
fertility-reducing effect of a PAYG pension system offset the savings-reducing effect, which 
is usually the outcome of the introduction of a pay-as-you-go pension system.  
Moreover, Zhang (1997, 2003, and 2006) and Li and Zhang (2008) provide another 
dimension on fertility and human capital accumulation. Their main assumptions are that 
individuals are perfectly altruistic in the sense of Barro (1974) with respect to their offspring 
and that the human capital accumulation is associated with external economies of scale. The 
latter idea introduced by Lucas (1988) show that the private rate of return of human capital 
building is lower than the social rate of return. Subsequently, a government subsidy as an 
incentive to invest in human capital is able to equalize the private and social rate of return.  
Although we acknowledge the role of external economies of scale, we make our 
arguments and the model even stronger without explicitly factoring it. Notably, all models 
which include human capital accumulation, but not perfect altruism in the sense of Barro 
(1974) exhibit intergenerational externalities because parents, who invest in the human capital 
of their off-spring do not take into account the positive effects of their investments for their 
grandchildren and great-grandchildren.  
Another approach was developed by Wigger (2001), who argues that an education 
subsidy financed by a lump-sum tax can be welfare-enhancing in a closed economy with a 
constant population, if the cross derivative of the production function between human capital 
and physical capital is positive and sufficiently large.  
As many others in the literature, we assume that parents derive a benefit from 
investing in the number of children and from investments in their children’s education. In 
such a framework, we want to show that it is possible to internalize the intergenerational 
externality in a small open economy with the help of a public debt without harming any 
generation. We argue that the generation that gains from a human capital investment 
(children) should pay for it instead of putting the entire burden of responsibility on the current 
generation (parents). Under these conditions, we show that it is possible to increase the 
growth of the economy by decreasing the number of children and increasing the growth rate 
of human capital accumulation. Probably, the model which is most closest to ours, is the 
model of Fanti and Gori (2008) who introduce a child allowance financed by a lump-sum tax 
and analyze the effects on human capital accumulation and fertility. In summary, their study 
show that a child allowance increases the investments in human capital and raises the fertility 
rate in the long run, while it lowers the fertility rate in the short run provided the preference 
for the quality of children exceeds the preference for the number of children. In our model, 
this is not the case; a child allowance would lead to the opposite regarding human capital 
building. We argue that by subsidizing education of children and not the number of them will 
have a growth and welfare enhancing effect and a negative effect on fertility if the preference 
for the quantity of children exceeds the preference for the quality for children.  
 The rest of the paper is outlined as follows. In section 2, we introduce the basic model. 
In section 3, we derive the short-run effects caused by the introduction of an education 
subsidy followed by an analysis of the long-run effects. Finally, in Section 5, we conclude. 
 
2 The model 
 
To model the production side of a small open economy, we use the approach of Lucas (1988) 
and Uzawa (1965). The production depends on physical and human capital and the production 
function has the following form: 
 
 = , 	 = , 
ℎ	.     (1) 
 
Here  is the production, is the capital stock, and	 = ℎ
, is the human capital stock 
which results from the product of the average human capital per head (ℎ) times the aggregate 
labor time ( 
 ). The production function exhibits the usual diminishing marginal 
productivities in each input factor, fulfills the Inada conditions and is linear homogenous.1 
The subscript t indicates the period of time.  
                                                 
1Expressed in per human capital unit the production function becomes to  =   , 1. We assume that the 
corresponding Inada conditions hold: 0	 = 0; 	∞	 = ∞;	∞	 = 0;	and ′0	 = ∞.   
Regarding the creation of human capital, for our purposes a very simple formulation 
of the human capital building process is sufficient, because we assume that all individuals are 
identical: 
 
ℎ = ℎ1 +  !	.      (2) 
 
Therefore the average human capital stock equals the individual human capital stock.  This 
means the average human capital in t, depends on the parental average human capital stock, 
the parental investments in education ! like schooling and the effectiveness of education	 >
0. The investments can be measured in monetary units,2 or in time units like parental time of 
home-schooling. However, we measure the human capital investments without loss of 
generality in time units the parents spend for teaching their children. These investments can 
be expressed in monetary terms, if we use the wage rate as the value of time at the margin. 
For simplicity, we define the total available time of an adult to be equal one. The efforts of the 
parents or investments in education are represented by	!, where 0 ≤ 	! < 1. It is easy to see 
that the human capital production function is one specification of the more general function 
established by de la Croix and Doepke (2003) or the one introduced by Azariadis and Drazen 
(1990). However, the resulting growth rate of human capital	%& becomes then to: 
 
%& =  !.       (3) 
 
We should mention that there is a positive externality caused by human capital building, 
because subsequent generations benefit from educational investments of former generations.  
The wage rate per human capital unit	'( and the interest factor	) are determined on 
the world capital market, because we consider a small country. The capital stock used in this 
economy adjusts according to the factor prices on the world market. Assuming that the 
physical capital is totally depreciated within one period, we get the following equations: 
 
'( =  −      (4) 
) =        (5) 
 
The function  =   , 1 represents the production function per human capital unit. 
Then the resulting wage rate per capita is given by	' = '(ℎ. For the rest of the paper we 
assume that world economy is in the long-run equilibrium and therefore, '( = '( , ∀,  and 
) = ), ∀,. 
 To model the consumption side of the economy, we use a three period overlapping 
generation (OLG) model, which is based on Allais (1947), Samuelson (1958) and Diamond 
(1965). This approach is extended by the introduction of human capital and endogenous 
fertility. Even that the fertility behavior is based on similar considerations like in Becker 
(1960) and Becker and Lewis (1973), 3  who introduced the quantity-quality trade-off of 
children, we use a different definition of a child’s quality. While for example Fanti and Gori 
(2008) use the definition of Becker (1960), where quality is defined as all expenditures for 
children, we define quality as time spent for the education of a child. The use of this narrower 
definition is not new (see for example Galor and Weil (1999) or de la Croix and Doepke 
(2003)). It should be noted that the results of the model depend on this definition. For 
example, the model of Fanti and Gori (2008), which used Becker’s broader definition of 
                                                 
2
 Then ! must be interpreted as the share of income which is spent for education. 
3Liu, Zhang, and Yi (2008), Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980) and Rosenzweig and Zhang (2009) confirm the 
existence of the quality-quantity tradeoff of children econometrically. 
 
child’s quality, has the disadvantage, that parents never invest in the quality of children if they 
do not get a child allowance. That means in a world without child allowances parents never 
invest in human capital building. If the total costs of rearing and educating a child matter as 
an argument in the utility function, then the pure child rearing costs have a utility enhancing 
effect and they are a perfect substitute to investments in education. In our model these costs 
do not enter the utility function directly and an increase of them decreases the utility of the 
representative individual indirectly. One good reason, why we decided to use human capital 
as an argument in the utility function is caused by the fact that it coincides with the 
assumptions of the Unified Growth Theory (Galor (2005)).   
In our model, in the first period of life, an individual is relatively young, not yet 
prepared to work, and/or participate in economic decision making, and hence undergoes 
education funded by her parents. In the second period of life, the individual supplies labor 
which is considered to be offered inelastically; gives birth to - children, rears and educates 
her off-spring and consumes . and saves	/ amounts respectively. In the third period of life 
the individual is unable to work and lives from her savings and interest income, that is,.01 =
)/. Subsequently, the utility function of the individual over the three periods is defined as 
the following log-linear equation. This form of the utility function is a variation of those used 
by de la Croix and Doepke (2003). The idea is that parents are not altruistic but enjoy directly 
the human capital of their children. However in contrast to the approach of Fanti and Gori 
(2008), Strulik (2003, 2004) or Galor and Weil (1996) we explicitly consider human capital of 
the children as an argument in the utility function. Therefore: 
 
2., .01 , -, ℎ0	=ln. + 5ln.01 + 6ln- + 7lnℎ0	.  (6) 
  
The parameter q reflects the subjective discount factor. Moreover, we make the natural 
assumption that parents have a stronger preference for the quantity than for the quality of 
children: 6 > 7. This assumption guarantees that the law of demand holds for the quality and 
quantity of children. In addition, it should be noted, that we assume that the parent treats all 
her children equally with respect to their education. A representative parent is constrained by 
the following budget:  
 
. ≤ '1 − 1 − 8	!- − 9- − :	 − /    (7) 
 
.01 ≤ )0/        (8) 
  
In the second period of life each individual has to allocate her available time between working 
time, time to educate the children 1 − 8	!- and time to rear the children	9-. The variable 
8 represents the subsidy rate. Assuming that it makes no difference, if parents educate their 
children or if they are educated in public or private schools, an alternative interpretation 
would be that parents pay for the schooling the amount 1 − 8	!'.   
Additionally, the individual has to pay a payroll tax, where the tax rate is :. If we 
normalize the available time to one and define ; as labor time, then ; = 1 − 1 − 8	!- −
9- − :	 and the net income becomes to ;' = ;'(ℎ. A second interpretation is that the 
individual earns the gross labor income ' and spends '1 − 8	!- units of her income for 
the education, '9-  units for child-rearing, where the parameter 0 < 9 < 1 represents the 
constant time share or constant income share which is needed to rear a child. Furthermore, she 
pays	': units as taxes. Equation (8) states that the individual lives in the third period of life 
from her savings and interest. Combining (7) and (8) gives us a single budget constraint: 
 
'1 − 1 − 8	!- − 9- − :	 − . − <=>
?
@=>
= 0.   (9) 
 We assume that the government finances the education subsidy by issuing government bonds 
	Awith a term of one period. Additionally the government collects the income share of  : as 
a payroll tax to finance its debt and interest payments. This means that the public debt per 
worker at the beginning of the current period B	equals the subsidy per child of the previous 
period times the interest factor, R. This implies, that a worker pays back the subsidy her 
parents received to market conditions. That is: 
 
    B = )A = )8!'.     (10) 
 
It should be noted that parents are unable to get an analogous loan contract on the 
capital market, because of legal restrictions and moral hazard problems. To guarantee a 
balanced government budget, the tax revenue per worker in period t has to be:  
 
    : = @CD>E = )
FGD>&D>
&
= @FGD>0HGD>.      (11) 
 
The government is financing the education subsidies by a public debt, which will be covered 
by the tax revenue in the future. Using (2), we maximize (6) subject to (9) by constructing the 
following Lagrange function:  
 

., .01 , I	=ln. + 5ln.01 + 6ln- + 7lnℎ1 +  !	 
   −I '1 − 1 − 8	!- − 9- − :	 − . − <=>
?
@=>
.  (12)  
 
Accordingly, the first order conditions are: 
 
    

<>
+ I = 0,        (13) 
J
<=>?
+ K@ = 0,        (14) 
L
M
+ I'N1 − 8	! + 9O = 0,    (15) 
HP
0HG
+ I'1 − 8	- = 0,     (16) 
'1 − 1 − 8	!- − 9- − :	 − . − <=>
?
@ = 0.    (17) 
 
Substituting (15) into (16) and solving for the investment in education gives us: 
 
!∗ = HPRF	LF	LP	H .      (18) 
 
From equation (18) we can derive the necessary condition for the existence of an interior 
solution for !∗ ∈ N0,1O: 
 
L
HP ≤
R
F	 < 
H0
H  
L
P − 1.       (19) 
 
Unfortunately, inequality (19) will not hold for all 8 ∈ N0,1O, because the expression in middle 
will strive to infinity if the subsidy rate converges to one. Therefore, we must restrict our 
analysis with respect to the subsidy rate. Especially, we assume throughout the paper that:  
 
L
HP ≤ 9 < 
H0
H  
L
P − 1.                 (20) 
 Given this condition the existence of an interior equilibrium is guaranteed in this economy 
without any government intervention. Consequently, we analyze the effects of a subsidy 
rate	8 ∈ N0, 8̅O, because all 8 > 8̅	lead into an undesirable corner solution in the equilibrium.   
Due to the fact that b has to lie between zero and one, we can derive from (20), that 
 7 > 6 must hold in the case of no subsidy	8 = 0	. In combination with the assumption that 
6 > 7, we can conclude that  9 > LP > 1. 
Subsequently, the growth rate of human capital is given by: 
 
%&∗ = HPRF	LF	LP	 .     (21) 
 
Solving for the remaining independent variables, we get the following equilibrium quantities:  
 
.∗ = &D>E
(VHPRHF@	F	0F	LF@W
HF	0J0L	LP	 ,    (22) 
.01∗ = )5 
&D>E(VHPRHF@	F	0F	LF@W
HF	0J0L	LP	 ,   (23) 
-∗ =
LP	VHPRHF@			F	0F	LF@W
0J0L	PHRF	? .    (24) 
 
Here we restrict our analysis to interior equilibria, which are characterized by a non-negative 
equilibrium fertility rate (-∗ ≥ 0), a non-negative and feasible investment in human capital 
(0 ≤ !∗ ≤ 1) and non-negative consumption levels in both periods of life. 
The reader may wonder, why we relate the equilibrium values to ℎ instead of ℎ, 
the reason is that we need this later to calculate the long-run effects caused by a change of 8. 
To secure that the tax rate : is smaller than one, the maximum subsidy rate 8̅	is given by the 
value of:  
 
8̅ = PH0@LRPH	0YH?P?R@	?1@LHP0R@1RH	0L?@?1L@ .   (25)  
 
In addition, it can be shown, that	-∗ ≥ 0, as long as 8 ∈ N0, 8̅O.  
 
Proposition 1: The existence of a unique interior equilibrium without government 
intervention is guaranteed if condition (20) is fulfilled. 
 
Proof:  
In the absence of a government intervention (18), and (21)-(24) becomes:      
!∗ = HPRLLP	H .      (18’) 
%&∗ = HPRLLP	 .      (21’) 
.∗ = &D>E(P
HR	
0J0L	LP	,     (22’) 
.01∗ = )5 &D>E(P
HR	
0J0L	LP	,    (23’) 
-∗ =
LP	H
0J0L	HR	.     (24’) 
 
As seen above, condition (20) guarantees, that 	0 < !∗ < 1 . Furthermore, the condition 
ensures that  9 > 1 . This, combined with the assumption 6 > 7	ascertains that all other 
independent variables have positive values. 
 Proposition 2: A unique interior equilibrium described by equations (18) and (21)-(24) exists, 
if 8 ∈ N0, 8̅O and condition (20) is fulfilled.  
 
Because of our small country assumption, the capital intensity per human capital unit 
is determined on the international capital market. The private savings per capita are given by: 
 
/∗ = 5ℎ'( 
VHPRHF@	F	0F	LF@W
HF	0J0L	LP	 .    (26)  
 
To calculate the amount of resources available to invest in physical capital, we have to 
subtract the amount of government bonds per head that are issued in the corresponding period. 
The government bonds per capita issued in the current period accumulate to:  
 
A = 8ℎ'(!∗-∗ = 8ℎ'(
VHPRHF@	F	0F	LF@WF	LHPR
F	0J0L	PHPH0F	? . (27) 
 
The net wealth per capita in the beginning of period t+1, Z0, is the savings per capita of 
period t minus the government bonds per capita issued in period t and the result divided by the 
number of children born in period t:   
 
Z0∗ = ℎ'(
VFP?HR0PF?J0L	0FHR	1JL	0JHR	?0F	FL?W
F	HLP	? .  (28) 
 
However, if the wealth per capita is smaller than the capital per capita, the country is a net 
borrower on the international capital market. Now we can analyze the short- and long-run 
effects of an increasing subsidy rate	8 on the equilibrium values of this economy.   
 
3 Short run effects  
 
If the government introduces an education subsidy in period 0, the parents are offered a 
subsidy for education, but they do not have to pay a tax like all following parent generations 
and their human capital stock is given. As a consequence, the budget constraint is somewhat 
different from (9), because	:[ = 0. Repeating the maximization procedure presented in the 
previous section with adjusted budget restriction leads to the following results:  
 
![ = HPR
F	L
F	LP	H.      (29) 
%[& = HPR
F	L
F	LP	 .      (30) 
.[ = &\E(0J0L	,       (31) 
.1 = )5 &\E(0J0L	,      (32) 
-[ =
LP	H
0J0L	HR0F	.     (33) 
 
Obviously, the consumption behavior, and therefore the savings behavior is not influenced by 
the introduction of the subsidy. However, the subsidy influences the level of education, the 
number of children and the per capita growth rate. Differentiating (29), (30) and (31) gives us: 
 
]G\
]F =
PR
F	?LP	 > 0,     (34) 
]^\_
]F =
HPR
F	?LP	 > 0,     (35) 
]<\>
]F =
]<>?
]F = 0.       (36) 
]M\
]F = −
LP	H
0J0L	HRF	? < 0.    (37) 
 
As expected, the subsidy enhances the level of education and therefore the growth rate of 
human capital accumulation. Simultaneously, the number of children declines. The result, that 
the aggregate consumption expenditures and the share of income spent for consumption 
remain unchanged is due to the additive separability of the utility function. This characteristic 
of the utility function leads to the result that only a substitution effect between the quantity 
and quality of children occurs. The subsidy decreases the relative price of the child quality 
and raises the relative price of the quantity of children. The outcome is a lower number of 
children, who receive a higher level of education. These effects lead to a change of the parents’ 
welfare:  
 
]`<\>,<>?,M\,&>
]F =
HPRF	L
F	HR0F	 > 0.     (38) 
 
The less surprising result is an increase of parents’ utility.   
 
Proposition 3: Undoubtedly, in the short run, the introduction of an education subsidy leads 
to an increase in the growth rate of human capital accumulation, the utility of the parents, and 
a decline of the fertility rate.  
 
Before entering the analysis of the long-run effects, we should note that the aggregated 
non-financial wealth of the economy declines, because a part of the savings will be invested 
in the government bonds, which are needed to finance the subsidies. However, the change of 
the non-financial wealth per capita does not necessarily decrease, because the number of 
children is also lower than in the previous periods. The non-financial wealth in period 1 is 
defined by:  
 
Z = a\F&\E(G\M\M\ =
&\E(JHR	F?J0L	FRPHLJ1HR	
F	LP	H .  (39) 
 
If an education subsidy will be introduced, the wealth per capita can be determined by 
differentiating (39) with respect to the subsidy rate and evaluating the derivative at 8 = 0: 
 
]b>
]F cFd[ =
&\E(J0LRPH	
HLP	 ⋚ 0.     (40) 
 
Proposition 4: The introduction of an education subsidy results in an increase of the non-
financial wealth per capita in the following period, only if the subjective time preference for 
the future is sufficiently large (5 > 97 − 6). 
 
This also means that the net borrowing position of the country will improve, if the condition 
of proposition 4 holds.  
 
 
4 Long-run effects 
 
This part of the analysis is relevant for all generations born in period zero and thereafter. In 
difference to the short-run analysis we have to take into account that each individual has to 
pay a tax, which is used to cover the public debt and the corresponding interest. 
Differentiating (18) and (21) leads to the following results: 
  
]G∗
]F =
PR
F	?LP	 > 0.      (41) 
 
]^_∗
]F =
HPR
F	?LP	 > 0.      (42) 
 
The long-run effects regarding the educational level and the growth rate of human capital are 
identical to the corresponding effects in the short-run.  
Because of the fact that the subsidy rate has to be sufficiently small, as pointed out in 
proposition 2, we evaluate the following derivatives at	8 = 0. As opposed to the educational 
time and growth rate, the number of children will decline more than in the short run. This is 
induced by the payroll tax which reduces the net income, and the assumption that the costs of 
rearing children develop proportionally to the gross income.    
 
]M∗
]F cFd[ = −
LP	HP0@HRPL	
HR	?0J0L	P < 0.     (43) 
 
As distinct from the short-run effects, the consumption in the first and second period of life 
will change, therefore the individual savings.   
 
]<>∗
]F cFd[ =
E(H?RP@HRPL	
0J0L	LP	H ⋚ 0,     (43) 
]<=>?∗
]F cFd[ =
E(@JH?RP@HRPL	
0J0L	LP	H ⋚ 0.    (44) 
 
The sign of the derivatives (43) and (44) depends, on among other parameter values, on the 
ratio between the education coefficient   and the interest factor R.  
 
Proposition 5: The introduction of an education subsidy financed by a public debt increases 
the consumption in both periods of life and the private savings only if, H@ > 1 −
L
HRP. 
 
As we know, the RHS of the condition in proposition 5 is by assumption less than one, and 
therefore the consumption can increase, even though the interest factor exceeds the education 
coefficient. This is caused by the reduction of the number of children.  
 Furthermore, it is interesting to examine how the education subsidy affects the non-
financial wealth per capita. Differentiating (28) subject to the subsidy rate and evaluating it at 
8 = 0, gives: 
 
]b=>∗
]F cFd[ =
E(PHPR0JH?R?L0HR	0L?
HLP	? ⋚ 0.   (45) 
 
Whether the non-financial wealth is increasing or decreasing depends strongly on the time 
preference for future consumption. Solving for the critical value of q leads to: 
 
5 = LP	HRPL	PHR	? .      (46) 
 
Proposition 6: The introduction of an education subsidy raises the non-financial wealth per 
capita, only if the subjective time preference factor q exceeds the critical value 5. 
 
If the condition of proposition 6 holds, the net borrowing position of the country will improve 
and maybe if the country was a debtor country it will become a lending country after 
introduction of the education subsidy in the long run.  
What remains is to analyze the long-run welfare effects. Accordingly, we have to 
consider whether all the generations in the (very) long-run are better-off because of the 
increased growth rate. Therefore, the relevant generation to consider is the one, which 
receives a minimal gain from the growth rate increase but has to bear a higher tax burden 
caused by the increased subsidy.  
We insert the corresponding equilibrium values (18) and (21)-(24) in the utility 
function (6), differentiate it with respect to the subsidy rate and evaluate the expression at 
8 = 0. Then, the result is:  
 
]`<>∗,<=>?∗ ,M∗,&=>
]F cFd[ =
0L0J	fHPRH@	0L@ gh>=i=jk
HPHR	 ⋚ 0.   (47) 
 
Setting the RHS of the derivative to zero and solving for R gives us: 
 
) = HPHR0L0J	L	0L0J	HRPL	 .      (48) 
 
Proposition 7: The introduction of an education subsidy financed by a public debt generates a 
Pareto-improvement only if the market interest factor is sufficiently low () < )).  
 
If the interest rate is too high, the tax burden outweighs the positive effect of increased growth 
and the additional utility generated by the extra human capital. Of course, the more time has 
elapsed since the introduction of the education subsidy, the more important is the growth 
effect. However, when the interest factor is not too large, a Pareto improvement can be 
realized.  
 
5 Conclusions  
In this paper, we show that building human capital financed through a public debt can 
provide a beneficial outcome both on the current and future generations, even in the absence 
of positive externalities and altruism in the sense of Barro (1974). Specifically, we have 
shown that the proposed finance mechanism reduces the fertility rate and enhance the human 
capital accumulation, and hence the per capita growth rate of income. It should be noted, that 
it is not necessary with respect to this result that the rate of return on human capital   exceeds 
the rate of return of physical capital R. Additionally, it was shown that the net borrowing 
position of the economy improves and the welfare in the sense of Pareto increases under 
certain conditions.  
If the propensity to save is not too small, the education subsidy will improve the net 
borrowing position of the country. In a world where altruistic motivations dominates parents 
preferences for their children’s education as future investment, the argument of subsidizing 
education becomes even stronger and the net savings tend to increase under certain conditions 
(as indicated above). Nevertheless, we have shown that when education is financed via a 
subsidy, the outcome is unambiguously welfare enhancing, if the real rate of return of 
physical capital is not too high. Therefore, from development aid perspective, it would make 
sense to give concessional loans to small and developing countries to finance education and 
human capital development in areas of resource deficit identified both in the developing and 
the developed economies. 
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